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ARTICLE 
 
Should fertility treatment be state funded?1  
Abstract:  
Many states offer generous provision of fertility treatment, but this article asks whether and 
how such state funding can be justified. I argue that, at most, there is limited justification for 
state funding of fertility treatment as one good among many that could enable citizens to 
pursue valuable life projects, but not one that should have the privileged access to funding it 
is currently given. I then consider and reject reasons one might think that fertility treatment 
has a special claim to funding, over the other goods that might enable life projects. First, I 
deny that fertility treatment has a special claim to funding on the grounds that infertility is a 
disease or disability. Second, I argue that individuals do not have a right to assistance with 
the project of having a child of their own. Third, I deny that providing fertility treatment is a 
special case on the grounds that having children is good for society. However, there may be 
one exception: states have a reason to fund fertility treatment for same-sex couples that 
does not apply to heterosexual couples. 
 
Introduction 
At present, the NHS offers up to three cycles of IVF to women under 40 and one cycle to 
women aged 40-42. Many countries offer far more generous provision, including France, 
Belgium and Slovenia; in Israel, for example, IVF cycles are funded up until the birth of two 
children for women under 45. However, IVF cycles often fail to result in live births. In the UK, 
for women aged 38-39, the failure rate per cycle is nearly 80% and even for the group that 
does best, of women under 35, the failure rate is 67.2%.2 This article asks whether and how 
such state funding of IVF and other assisted reproductive technologies can be justified.  
 Many of the ethical issues surrounding such fertility treatment are much debated, 
such as whether assisted reproductive technologies should be used to select for children 
with particular characteristics.3 So too, there are debates over the details of the provision of 
fertility treatment; for instance, regarding whether age or having existing children should 
affect eligibility for treatment, or over the unequal provision of treatment across local 
authorities in the UK.4 Yet, as John McMillan has observed, less attention has been paid to 
the more general question of whether fertility treatment should be state funded at all.5 
Further, that attention which has been paid has largely defended such provision, with the 
notable exception of some feminist critiques.6  
  
However, despite many states’ generous funding for fertility treatment, I argue that such 
provision cannot be justified as simply one component of a more general state funded 
healthcare system. Instead, there is, at best, a far more limited justification of funding on the 
grounds that fertility treatment is just one good among many that enables citizens to pursue 
valuable life projects, but not one that should have the privileged access to funding it is 
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currently given over and above these other goods. Clarifying the justification of fertility 
treatment has implications both for what goods it must compete with for funding and for its 
resulting pattern of distribution.   
   
To begin, I outline the limited justification for fertility treatment that I propose. I then consider 
and reject reasons that fertility treatment might have special or privileged claim to funding 
over the other goods that enable valuable life projects. First, in section 2, I deny that fertility 
treatment has a special claim to funding on the grounds that infertility is a disease or 
disability. Second, in section 3, I argue that individuals do not have a right or otherwise 
special claim to assistance with the project of having a child of their own. Third, in section 4, I 
deny that providing fertility treatment is a special case on the grounds that having children is 
good for society. There is, however, one exception: there is a reason for states to fund 
treatment for same-sex couples that does not apply to heterosexual couples. 
 
1.  One good among many 
To start, I suggest that having a child of one’s own is best characterised as one project that 
can make for a valuable or meaningful life among many including, say, careers, intimate 
relationships, or religious practices. So too, there are a diversity of conceptions of the good 
among citizens and, hence, ideas about what forms part of a good life. So, while for one 
individual what makes life goes well might be having a rewarding job, for another it may be 
raising a family or travelling to new places and for someone else, trips to the gym and meals 
with friends. In addition, not all lives with meaning or that go well must include raising 
children, let alone having children of one’s own in the sense that fertility treatment permits. 
To deny this is to deny that those who choose to remain childless or who adopt instead of 
going though fertility treatment can lead good and meaningful lives.  
  
As such, I propose that fertility treatment is one among many goods that states could provide 
to enable citizens to pursue their diverse valuable life projects or have access to activities 
that make their life go well or seem meaningful. States may sometimes provide funding for 
the activities that we value, for instance, helping citizens to own their own home or providing 
access to green places for leisure activities. However, since resources are limited, states 
cannot provide any and every good that might enable each particular life project.7 Choices 
have to be made.  
  
Thus, this article’s argument is that if – and only in so far as – states should directly fund 
citizens’ life projects, then fertility treatment has to compete for limited resources with the 
funding of other valuable life projects. As this article will defend, it is unjustifiable for a state 
to provide fertility treatment more generously than it funds other valuable life projects, in both 
the quantity of funding and the lack of means testing.  
  
Yet, at present, many countries are disproportionately generous in their funding of fertility 
treatment, as compared to the other goods that might make one’s life go well or enable 
valuable life projects. To illustrate, consider the following UK-based examples. IVF is not 
means tested in its distribution as are other similar goods, like grants for higher education. 
So too, is it justifiable that a 40-year-old woman is funded to have a chance at having a child, 
but housing benefit is limited such that those under 35 cannot live in a flat of their own and 
unemployment benefit restricted so those on it are not permitted to holiday abroad? 
Alternatively, why is fertility treatment funded but not undergraduate or master’s degrees that 
might provide a better choice of careers? Indeed, the cost of a master’s degree is fairly 
similar to the cost of a couple of IVF cycles.8 Or, why fund a chance at having a child of one’s 
own, but not the goods that might enable the formation of other kinds of valuable intimate 
relationships, such as dating websites? 
  
So, if one holds that states should fund valuable life projects, then I suggest that the 
conclusion of this article is that funding for fertility treatment should be reduced. 9  The 
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alternative would be to fund each and every good that would enable citizens to pursue their 
myriad particular life projects more generously, so that their funding is akin to that for fertility 
treatment. However, given resource constraints, a far more likely outcome is a reduction in 
the generosity of fertility treatment funding, at least from the levels of many European 
countries. 
  
In contrast, however, if one holds that states should not directly fund life projects, then fertility 
treatment should not be state funded. It is beyond this article’s scope to defend the claim that 
a state should so fund life projects; indeed, later I suggest reasons for scepticism about state 
funding of intimate relationships in particular. Instead, my argument is that the appeal to 
valuable life projects is the best available justification for funding fertility treatment, but even it 
does not justify the current comparative generosity of state funding, of providing generous 
non-means tested funding of fertility treatment and not other goods that would also promote 
valuable lives. To make this argument, the rest of the article considers and rejects three sets 
of reasons to give fertility treatment privileged or special status in comparison to other goods 
that promote valuable life projects or activities: reasons that would justify funding for many 
seeking fertility treatment that would not apply to funding for the pursuit of a myriad of other 
life goals.10  
  
2.  But it’s a disease 
First, I consider perhaps the most obvious grounds for privileged access to funding: that 
infertility is a disease and, hence, in so far as states should pay for citizens’ healthcare, 
fertility treatment should be funded as just one dimension of that care. Indeed, healthcare is 
often regarded as a good states should provide.11 Something like this justification is prevalent 
among those defending funding fertility treatment; for instance, McMillan claims that fertility 
treatment meets a medical need and, within debates over its precise allocation, fertility 
treatment is often treated as one more element of healthcare.12 However, I now argue that an 
appeal to disease forms a poor justification for funding fertility treatment: infertility fails to 
count as a disease in the relevant sense needed to justify funding and the resulting pattern of 
distribution from this justification is anyway undesirable.  
  
When allocating fertility treatment, infertility is commonly defined as not conceiving a child 
after one, or sometimes two, years of regular unprotected heterosexual intercourse.13 To 
examine whether infertility is a disease so defined, I begin with the biostatistical model where 
disease is defined as an adverse departure from normal species functioning, and so a 
deviation from what is statistically normal given one’s age and sex.14 On this view, infertility is 
a disease where an individual falls short of the statistical norm in time to conception, given 
their age and sex. Daniels uses this model of disease when justifying healthcare funding 
where, and on the grounds that, it helps secure to equality of opportunity, which McMillan 
applies to fertility treatment in particular.15 
  
However, for many seeking fertility treatment, being unable to conceive for a year may not be 
a clear failure of normal functioning. Fertility declines with age, yet the average age of a 
woman seeking IVF on the NHS is 35 and one third of those who receive treatment are over 
37.16 Treating the common effects of ageing is not to restore normal functioning: it is normal, 
statistically-speaking, for ageing to lead to a loss of certain capabilities. Nor do single women 
refraining from having unprotected sex or same-sex couples suffer a failure of normal 
functioning in failing to conceive in a twelve month period. As such, it is doubtful that some 
claim of statistical normality will succeed in showing that fertility treatment always, or even 
tends to, treat a disease understood as a failure in normal species functioning. 
  
One might object that some seeking fertility treatment clearly do suffer a failure of normal 
functioning; for instance, a couple in their twenties or a woman with blocked fallopian tubes. 
However, that does not show that ‘it is a disease’ succeeds as a justification for most cases; 
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instead, those suffering a genuine failure in normal species functioning may be the outliers. 
Justifying the current provision of fertility treatment requires a more wide-reaching defence.  
  
Yet, it might be further objected that the common definition of infertility is merely a rule of 
thumb, indicating when it is medically sensible to intervene in the normal processes of 
reproduction, rather than an account of disease. But, one might continue, infertility remains a 
disease. The majority of those seeking fertility treatment would probably conceive after 
some, perhaps longer, period of time. 
  
However, regardless of whether infertility could be seen as, in general, a failure of normal 
functioning, a second and more serious problem arises in taking that failure to justify the 
funding of fertility treatment. It matters that infertility can be defined as an adverse departure 
from normal functioning in a relevant sense to justify funding treatment. Not just any 
statistical abnormality can count, otherwise we end up with morally reprehensible 
conclusions where we should fund treatment for things like homosexuality, as it is not the 
statistical norm.17 Furthermore, lack of reproductive success cannot itself suffice to make for 
an adverse departure: we would not want to conclude that those preferring same-sex 
partners have a disease, given the reproductive failure resulting from their statistically 
unusual sexual preference, let alone that it should be treated. So, there must be some role 
for value somewhere on the way from labelling something a disease to holding that diseases 
should be treated, especially where the state provides that treatment. Further, it would not 
suffice to claim, inspired by Daniels, that we would only treat those diseases that undermine 
equal opportunity: there is reason to be troubled by calling homosexuality a disease, even if 
not one to be treated. 
  
Some draw the strong conclusion that one cannot rely on a biological model of disease, 
instead proposing a value-laden model, where our values alone define disease. Others hold 
that one can have a biostatistical model but add a notion of adverse functioning that 
discriminates in the right way.18 Either way, however, there are particular problems with 
regarding infertility as a disease to be treated by state-funded healthcare: if infertility is a form 
of adverse functioning, it is not one that is adverse in the right way to justify funding.19 
  
Many physical diseases clearly count as adverse states of affairs given they cause, or 
increase the risk of, physical pain, limited mobility, or decreased life span. Infertility, itself, 
does not have any such consequences.20 However, infertility does share with many diseases 
the feature of causing suffering. For some, the desire to have children is deep-rooted, and 
those unable to conceive may suffer psychological turmoil. At first glance, that it causes 
suffering might seem to show infertility is an adverse state of affairs in the salient respect to 
count as a disease to treat. Yet, in response, first, fertility treatment is not always a good cure 
for the turmoil or psychological distress facing those who wish to conceive but cannot. It is 
often ineffective, and so fails to alleviate distress. Indeed, since repeated failures may 
heighten distress it may be that the more generous the state provision of fertility treatment, 
the greater the suffering caused, given the psychological stress of undergoing treatment, 
even aside from its physical risks. 
  
Second, one should ask whether the way in which failing to conceive causes psychological 
distress grounds a claim to funded medical intervention. Note here that the distress from 
lacking a child is not akin to that caused by some mental illnesses. Instead, the frustration of 
any valuable life project may cause distress. Yet that frustration and distress is not generally 
reason to treat medically, even where we can: a person too short to join the police is not, by 
virtue of their deep rooted commitment to having that job, entitled to funding for leg-
lengthening operations. The worry is that we are beginning to lose touch with what made 
health seemingly a special category, with privileged claim to funding. Too many other life 
projects may cause distress if thwarted and could be alleviated by medical intervention.   
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The same argument applies if one broadens the notion of adverse functioning to include 
those physical features limiting choices or opportunities, or that lead to disadvantage or 
perceived disadvantage. An array of medical treatments could be offered to those failing to 
achieve what they desire: boob jobs for those wanting to be glamour models, Modafinil or 
Ritalin for those without ADHD but who want to do better in their education, and so on. The 
argument here is not merely that there might be some slippery slope to funding too many 
medical interventions; rather, the claimed ‘specialness’ of health, which grounds its privileged 
access to funding, is undermined through incorporating all such thwarted desires. Further, 
again, the desire to have a child does not seem special, in terms of entitlement to funding, as 
compared to other goods. The normal functioning part of McMillan’s or Daniels’ argument, 
then, turns out to be central after all, if we want to say healthcare has special claim to 
funding.   
  
However, there is one exception to the arguments above. Compassion and a desire to 
alleviate distress may motivate us to provide fertility treatment to those suffer a terrible illness 
rendering them infertile, whether directly or through treatment; this might, for instance, 
include some cancer sufferers. There are two possible motivations here: that this is all we 
can do to alleviate the special awfulness of their situation, or that we should correct for 
damage caused by medical intervention and so provide funding where infertility is a side-
effect of treatment.21  Funding fertility treatment in these cases may have an equivalent 
justification to breast reconstruction after a preventative mastectomy or to funding wigs for 
those suffering hair loss from chemotherapy. However, the standard case of the infertile 
couple does not create a demand for compassion of the same kind and this article seeks a 
general justification of fertility treatment. Frustration in having one’s own child is not the kind 
of thing that grounds a claim to special treatment on the grounds of the rare awfulness of 
one’s situation: it is just like any other frustration of a life goal.  
  
At the least, the arguments thus far show that fertility treatment is not easily seen as one 
straightforward instance of a more general justification of state funded healthcare: on a 
biostatistical model, infertility may not count as a disease for the majority seeking fertility 
treatment and, regardless, infertility is unlike other physical diseases in causing 
psychological distress rather than having consequences such as physical pain, likelihood of 
limited life or diminished mobility. Further, as one final problem, justifying fertility treatment on 
the grounds of an appeal to disease might result in an unattractive pattern of distribution.  
  
With adverse functioning as part of our definition of disease, those with clear underlying 
causes for infertility, such as blocked fallopian tubes, may have greater entitlement to 
treatment than those for whom the causes of infertility is unclear. This issue is especially 
likely at an age where conception is less probable, although still possible: on the adverse 
functioning account, the woman with a clear deviation from normal functioning with blocked 
tubes would have a claim to immediate treatment, whereas perhaps we would make the 
woman who is infertile for unknown reasons wait an amount of time deemed statistically 
normal for her age. Yet, there is reason not to discriminate between the two groups: the 
distress caused may be much the same, given both are frustrated in their pursuit of a 
valuable life project. So too, for those who focus on suffering rather than functioning to 
determine whether to treat or what is a disease, the differing degree of distress among 
individuals might lead one to conclude that the more emotionally perturbed the individual, the 
more ‘diseased’ they are, and so the more deserving of treatment.  
  
The rest of the article turns to consider two further justifications of funding fertility treatment 
over other goods that might enable people to pursue valuable life projects. Before doing so, 
however, I briefly consider whether an argument from appeal to disability succeeds to any 
greater extent than a disease-based one. Following the WHO, one might hold that infertility is 
a disability, understood as an impairment with social consequences. States might then fund 
fertility treatment to alleviate the social consequences of the disability, just as they might fund 
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wheelchairs for those unable to walk. However, on this medical model of disability as an 
impairment in normal functioning, parallel arguments apply to those above regarding 
disease.22 Again, then, does infertility constitute a lack of normal functioning for most seeking 
treatment? If so, is it a failure in the relevant respect to ground a demand a claim for medical 
treatment or akin to other frustrations in our various different life projects? 
  
However, a social model of disability raises some interesting questions. On this model, a 
disability is best understood as a product of how society is structured. Indeed, at least some 
infertility is a direct result of society’s structure: for instance, for those women who delay 
having children owing to the career structure that they face, then struggle to conceive. 
Likewise, it may be because we structure society around raising children in a nuclear family 
that lacking a child of one’s own is an important form of disadvantage that deprives people of 
a crucial kind of relationship. But we have a choice: change society or the individual. Hence, 
on a social model an appeal to disability does not show that we should intervene medically 
rather than by tackling social structures. Further, section 4 argues that, for most instances of 
infertility, there is reason to change society instead. First, however, I address whether there 
is something special for individuals about having a child of one’s own.  
 
3.  The uniqueness of parenting? 
Some might hold that having one’s own child is somehow different from other activities that 
could give our lives meaning or contribute to our wellbeing. On the grounds of this 
uniqueness, one might argue that fertility treatment deserves privileged access to funding. 
However, in the arguments to follow, I defend the comparison of having one’s own child to 
other projects that might make life go well by rejecting two arguments that parenting is 
different: an appeal to a right to parent and to what the majority want. 
  
I begin by asking whether individuals have a right to become parents, and a right of a kind 
that creates a claim for assistance from society. Here, one cannot just appeal to the human 
right to marry and found a family found in the UN declaration. As Warnock has observed, this 
is a right not to be debarred from forming a family, not a right to assistance.23 To support this, 
consider that – barring a handful of political philosophers – few think a state must fund 
people’s attempts to find a marital partner, let alone that this is a human right. At any rate, 
appealing to human rights does nothing to address the more basic question of what grounds 
the right. Here, I turn to address that more basic question. Note, however, that my argument 
is limited to the right to assistance with having one’s own child: there are a whole cluster of 
reasons unaffected by my arguments that could ground both a right to parent one’s existing 
children and to reproductive autonomy in choosing whether to try to concieve or whether to 
terminate a pregnancy.  
  
So, first, one might offer a very strong grounds of the right by claiming that having a child of 
one’s own is a basic need: either as a biological imperative or an essential component of 
human flourishing. Yet, according to the ONS, in 2011, one in five women aged 45 had never 
given birth, and there are good reasons to refrain from claiming that these women, some of 
whom will be childless out of choice, fail to have their basic needs met or are unable to 
flourish.24 First, such a claim looks implausible: there is limited and inconclusive evidence on 
whether whether children increase overall life satisfaction or happiness.25 For some, at least, 
a life devoted to rearing children is unrewarding: consider the description of valium as 
‘mother’s little helper’. Second, to make such a claim would be disrespectful of the life 
choices of others. That sort of disrespect is particularly inappropriate from states: a state 
should not disrespect the choice to remain childless or adopt. In addition, against a 
background of gender inequality and a long history of reducing women to their biological 
functions, we should be especially wary of the claims of a biological imperative or basic need 
to have children, or of its unique importance for a valuable life.26  
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It might be objected that nonetheless a variant of the above defence succeeds: for those who 
want a child, it is essential for their flourishing or even a basic need that they are able to have 
a child.27 However, again this claim is untrue. While it may be a serious setback in one’s life 
plans to be unable to conceive and yet wish to, some succeed in flourishing regardless. So 
too, this line of defence would not succeed in showing that having a child is special among 
life projects: the frustration of any life plan to which we are deeply committed may be a 
setback to our flourishing. Again, my goal is to deny that fertility treatment should have 
special funding status, over and above other life projects.  
  
As an alternative grounds, however, one might argue that while having a child of one’s own 
is not a basic need it still has special importance. To do so, one might appeal to existing 
defences of the right to parent one’s own child and consider if they extend to a right to 
become a parent. Some such accounts are irrelevant for my purposes here. ‘Child-centred’ 
accounts, grounding the right to parent on the interests of the child in being raised by their 
biological parents, cannot apply to possible future children like those who are the desired 
result of fertility treatment.28 Attempting to extend such accounts to not yet existing children is 
liable to create serious issues with the non-identity problem, and perhaps some variant of the 
repugnant conclusion.29 To talk of benefits to not yet existing children, if even coherent given 
there is no existing entity who benefits, might imply that all have a duty to have as many 
children as possible to bring about these benefits.  
  
A ‘parent-centred’ approach appears, at first glance, more promising. 30  Indeed, Jurgen 
DeWispelaere and Daniel Weinstock appeal to Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift’s defence of 
the specialness of the parent-child relationship to claim that states have an obligation to 
promote the ‘fundamental right’ to parent, and so to facilitate it through either fertility 
treatment or adoption.31 On this view, having a child makes a distinctive contribution to 
wellbeing and flourishing owing to the unique moral quality of the parent-child relationship. 
Children are vulnerable and dependent, lack the ability to exit, are initially trusting and 
unconditionally loving. As a result, parents have special responsibility for the child’s 
immediate wellbeing and future development. Parenting, Brighouse and Swift claim, thus 
enables people to develop and exercise capacities that contribute, for many, to living ‘fully 
flourishing lives’.32  
  
Having children, then, is taken to be unique: it is not interchangeable with, nor substitutable 
by, other forms of intimate relationship.33 Brighouse and Swift do allow, however, that people 
can flourish without children. So, is this sense of the uniqueness of the relationship enough 
to ground a right to assistance to become a parent? While DeWispelaere and Weinstock 
argue that the availability of adoptive children may limit provision of fertility treatment, here I 
question the uniqueness of having a child of one’s own, whether through adoption or fertility 
treatment.  
  
For each feature claimed to make the parent-child relationship unique, other intimate or 
caring relationships exist which share that feature. One could also find these features in a 
collection of separate relationships. So, one might care for an elderly relative with dementia, 
where there might be limited reciprocity in the relationship and one was responsible for the 
vulnerable relative’s wellbeing. Alternatively, one might care for a pet dog with no ability to 
exit, and where the trust of that pet was spontaneous. So too, friendships and other adult 
intimate relationships may share features of the parental relationship, albeit more fleetingly: 
we can help those close to us with future plans, care for them when they are vulnerable and 
so on.  
  
Furthermore, one can have important and valuable relationships with children who are not 
one’s own. Responsibilities for a child’s future development and current wellbeing might be 
shared with godparents, child minders, teachers or relatives. One might develop and 
exercise very similar capacities in these roles to those involved in parenting. As such, it is 
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doubtful that parent-child relationships are non-substitutable: some combination of the 
various other important caring relationships that form part of a life may suffice. To argue for 
uniqueness of parent-child relations is to undervalue or overlook the diversity and depth of 
people’s connections to one another outside of that particular relationship.  
  
Yet it might be objected that something remains unique in the extensiveness of a parent’s 
control and responsibility over a child, as compared to other intimate relationships with adults 
or with children not one’s own. Alternatively, one might claim that the specialness of the 
parent-child relationship cannot be broken down into separate components, but is somehow 
an emergent property of relationships bearing all the salient features. However, that does not 
show that states should fund the chance of having this particular kind of relationship over and 
above other forms of intimate relationship, even supposing that states should be funding 
relationships. One could argue that all intimate relationships are, in their own way, unique. In 
addition, to insist that the degree of control that parents in a nuclear family have over children 
is special, and to deny the importance of relationships with other adults for a child, is to 
privilege a very historically and socially particular form of intimate relationship.  
  
Further, even if there is some unique quality to the parent-child relationship, that does not 
show that it is special as compared to other valuable life projects, such that it should have 
privileged access to funding as at present. All manner of intimate relationships aside from 
having a child of one’s own through fertility treatment may make distinctive contributions to 
wellbeing and flourishing. As might all manner of other life projects. Furthermore, a problem 
with treating having children as akin to other life projects may even be highlighted through 
considering providing fertility treatment as an extension to parental rights. One possible 
defence of parental rights is that states should not interfere in valuable intimate relationships, 
unless the relationships involve abuse and neglect. As such, the state’s main duty may be a 
negative one of leaving space for such relationships, rather than interfering in them or 
privileging one form over another as in funding fertility treatment. Fertility treatment, then, 
may be unlike the other goods that enable valuable life projects. 
  
Here, however, one might object that there is still a plausible ground to think parenting 
special: that the majority desire to become parents. Burley offers something like this 
argument, claiming that behind a veil of ignorance, ‘the average individual would deem 
having genetically related offspring a constitutive element of leading a good life’.34 Appealing 
to Dworkin’s hypothetical insurance market, she argues that we would choose to insure 
against being infertile, and as such there is reason to fund fertility treatment.35 That the 
majority have children and think it constitutes part of a good life to the extent they would 
insure against its absence, suffices to make infertility different to other barriers to life 
projects. One might further argue that having children makes a larger contribution to the 
welfare of most people than other goods or life projects.  
  
Yet, first, having one’s own child is not made unique among life projects merely by being 
widespread: a desire for intimate romantic relationships or a rewarding career are also 
widespread and, in the UK, so is owning one’s own house. Second, the empirical basis for 
the claim that having children contributes more to welfare than other projects or goods is 
dubious at best. Some evidence suggests that having children leads to a drop in overall life 
satisfaction, recovered only when the child leaves home.36 
  
Regardless, however, one might insist that if the majority desire a particular good then it 
would be undemocratic for a state not to provide it. In reply, this would disadvantage those 
who have less popular life projects: if – and only if – a state should fund valuable life projects, 
it should do so evenly in giving individuals equivalent levels of funding for their life projects. 
In addition, in the context of feminist concerns about the construction of female identity 
around motherhood and fertility treatment as reinforcing that, mentioned earlier, we may be 
especially concerned if states disproportionately fund this one good.  
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So, at best, fertility treatment should only be funded if and in so far as we also fund other 
valuable life projects. Desiring to have one’s own child is but one particular conception of a 
component of a good life among others and not one which has special claim to assistance 
grounded on an appeal to health, rights, or the majority. However, I now consider one final 
set of objections to my argument against the privileged funding status of fertility treatment: 
that a society has reason to provide such treatment aside from its value to the individual or 
couple. 
 
4.  Children are good for society 
One might argue that having children is a social good, given that having future citizens 
ensures state stability and the continued funding of goods like pensions.37 However, the 
good of having children is met by a society producing a sufficient number of future citizens 
through reproduction or admitting migrants to make up for any shortfall. It is not necessary 
that all have children and not is having one extra child obviously a social good. Indeed, given 
the cost to society and the environment of having a child one may think there are good 
reasons not to have too many children born to a population, such that refraining itself may be 
a social good. So, funding fertility treatment is not good for society on the grounds that it 
ensures state stability – unless a population is in severe decline without it.  
  
However, one might object that any child is an overall benefit to society, given the child’s 
likely future contributions, such that funding fertility treatment pays for itself. Yet, while 
making this calculation is tricky, two factors make its success improbable.38 First, to raise a 
child is costly, even without IVF. Second, it tends to be cheaper for societies to allow adult 
migrants in rather than raise a child from scratch.  
  
A different line of defence argues that fertility treatment has a claim to funding as it promotes 
equality: surely all should be able to have children and not only the rich or those with the 
brute luck to be fertile. Yet that does not show that fertility treatment is different to the other 
goods that enable the pursuit of valuable life projects. Indeed, it may be desirable to 
decrease inequality or the effects of bad brute luck and ensure that all can lead valuable and 
meaningful lives, but that is no argument that children are unique and fertility treatment 
should receive its current, uneven level of funding. Furthermore, in a more equal society we 
may have even less reason to fund fertility treatment: citizens would be able to afford to pay 
for it themselves, if they desire it.  
  
Another variant of the inequality argument, however, holds that fertility treatment is special as 
it corrects for a particular inequality. In many professions, women’s most fertile period 
coincides with the crucial period for becoming established in a career. As a result, many 
women delay childbearing then suffer consequences in struggling to conceive. So, one might 
argue that women face a structural injustice that could be mitigated through provision of 
fertility treatment in their middle-age. 
  
Yet we have two options when faced with a structural injustice: we can change the individual 
or the structure. To provide fertility treatment in this case is to make a structural problem into 
a problem with the individual, who is deemed infertile and so poorly functioning. Providing a 
not very good chance at conceiving through medical intervention does nothing to undermine 
structural injustice. It might be objected that we should still provide fertility treatment to 
women currently adversely affected by structural injustice as an interim solution, although in 
the long term we should change the structure. However, funding fertility treatment may even 
support the injustice, since it is liable to reduce pressure for change: that women cannot 
have children easily at a stage convenient for employers becomes a medical issue. Further, 
against fears that refusing funding for fertility treatment sacrifices current women for the sake 
of future gains, giving women a poor chance at having a child later on is an inadequate form 
of compensation.  
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Nonetheless, there is an exception here, of funding assisted reproduction for same-sex 
couples. State support for heterosexual couples and for the traditional nuclear family, such 
as limits on access to marriage and tax breaks for families, may be forms of structural 
injustice that have made it harder for same-sex couples to form their desired kinds of family 
unit. So too, life choices are made harder by the prevalent notion that the heterosexual 
nuclear family is the ideal place to raise children, which restricts access to caring relations 
with children. However, in contrast to the case of women in general, here fertility treatment 
might act to undermine the structural injustice. 39  Fertility treatment might challenge the 
normal construction of the family through creating new forms of family. Further, fertility 
treatment in this case may well be a social good, in supporting a diversity in ways of life with 
these varied forms of the family.40 In contrast, fertility treatment for heterosexual couples 
further reinforces the very same ideal of the traditional, heterosexual, nuclear family.  
  
All the same, the above gives but one consideration in favour of funding fertility treatment for 
same-sex couples. It may be that the possibility of adoption is enough to create diverse 
forms of family life and to challenge injustice. But it may also be that more is required of a 
state to respond to injustice – and fertility treatment is one plausible part of that response.41 
Indeed, fertility treatment may present a greater challenge to traditional constructions of the 
traditional nuclear family than adoption does, in challenging ideas about who can have 
children and not only who can rear them.42 
  
However, one might object that such funding would still act to support the nuclear family 
ideal, of two parents plus children, even if it would encourage greater flexibility in who can be 
parents.43 One might even take such an idea further, and make the case for funding fertility 
treatment for single persons who desire children, to alleviate the structural injustices 
associated with the nuclear family. In response, however, one would have to weigh the 
respective injustices of supporting the notion of a nuclear, if not traditional, family against that 
of excluding those who desire same-sex partners from such a notion of the family. I suspect 
that the injustice of the latter would be greater than the former. So too, I suggest that the 
argument for funding fertility treatment for single persons is weaker than that for same-sex 
couples, owing to the great number of existing single parent households. Partly as a result, 
the injustices facing such single parent households, while considerable, are most likely better 
solved through means other than that of creating more such households; for instance, by 
undermining social stigma and alleviating poverty.  
 
5.  Conclusion: The distribution of fertility treatment 
To conclude, states have greater reason to provide fertility treatment for same-sex couples 
than for heterosexual couples who, I have argued, have no special claim to this good over 
and above other goods that promote valuable life goals. This article does not suggest that 
individuals do anything wrong in using IVF if a state offers it, but instead presents a 
challenge to current funding priorities. Further, it suggests a limit to the extensiveness of the 
right to parent one’s children: it is not a right to assistance to have a child. To close, I reflect 
on the scope of these conclusions.  
  
While this article focuses on current, non-ideal societies, one might claim that in an ideal 
society everyone would have access to fertility treatment and every other good that makes 
life go well. Yet even in ideal societies, resources will be limited, and so it still matters that we 
get clear on whether fertility treatment is a good that should be provided as part of 
healthcare, or something to which we have a right, or one good that can make a life go well. 
Answering that question will have implications for a range of much debated issues. So, to 
illustrate, on a valuable projects approach – assuming we fund life projects – then there is no 
reason internal to the justification of funding that factor such as age and existing children 
should matter when distributing fertility treatment. As such, settling the question of what 
justifies fertility treatment promises to shape how the good should be distributed.  
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